AircraftOwner Online

During those first few hours of flight training, a student pilot is asked to memorize lots of numbers—airspeeds, power settings, runway headings, and traffic pattern altitudes for local airports, to name a few. In the approach and landing phase of a flight, airspeed numbers carry particular significance because minding or ignoring them can mean touching down safely on the intended point or overshooting and ending up in the weeds.

Then, just when the student has dutifully memorized the published numbers, it’s time to learn that sometimes they are adjusted to handle a particular situation. For instance, final approach is flown a little bit faster on a gusty day to compensate

for the variable wind.

But, how much is a little bit? Why do these numbers matter anyway? Why can’t we just fly like the old timers did, by the seat of our pants, and not worry so much about all of these numbers?

The truth is that the more experience a pilot accumulates, the easier it is to control the airplane by feel because the numbers become, in a sense, ingrained in how we fly. We don’t need to look at the tachometer while setting the throttle because we just know, using our tactile, visual, and auditory senses, that everything is configured properly. We set the power and pitch and then scan the instruments to confirm that we got what we asked for. Even while flying on instruments, we don’t fixate on the airspeed indicator or the power setting—our primary focus is on the numberless attitude indicator, just as a student pilot’s primary focus is directed outside the airplane, at the earth and sky.

 

Final Approach and Vref

To understand how final-approach airspeed is determined for a given airplane, we have to start with the landing—the stall, the moment the airplane stops flying—and work the problem in reverse, back up the final-approach course. In a general sense, the speed at which we want to fly the final approach is some airspeed above the stalling speed that will let us stay aloft while we descend toward the runway, but not have so much excess lift that the airplane will not stop flying when we want it to touch down.

Part 23 of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), which deals with aircraft certification, states that  for normal, utility, and acrobatic category reciprocating engine-powered airplanes of 6,000 pounds or less maximum weight, the reference landing approach speed (Vref) must not be less than the greater of Vmc, determined in 14 CFR section 23.149(b) with the wing flaps in the most extended takeoff position, and 1.3 Vso.”

A common memory aid for Vso is that it is the stall speed with “stuff out,” meaning landing gear and flaps extended. The regulations define Vref as “the speed of the airplane, in a specified landing configuration, at the point where it descends through the 50-foot height in the determination of the landing distance.” You may have heard pilots refer to this point in the landing approach as when the airplane is “crossing the fence” or “over the numbers.” This is typically the point at which power is reduced, perhaps all the way to idle, and a smooth transition begins from a descent, to a level off, flare, and, finally, touchdown. (Vmc, or minimum control airspeed with the critical engine inoperative, refers to airplanes with more than one engine. For simplicity and brevity we’ll limit discussion in this article to single-engine operations.)

Typically, we fly final approach at some airspeed greater than Vref, because in many light airplanes, Vref is just not a comfortable place to be. It’s too slow; it feels mushy. The manufacturer’s recommended final approach airspeed gives the pilot

a generous cushion above the stall that allows for the bit of gentle maneuvering that is necessary to keep the airplane aligned with the runway centerline. The pilot operating handbook (POH) for the 2001 Cessna 182S that I fly shows that Vso at maximum takeoff weight, zero-bank angle, is 35 knots indicated airspeed at the most rearward center of gravity (CG) and 36 knots at the most forward CG position. Assuming that the average pilot cannot reasonably discern a one-knot difference, we’ll use the higher number of 36 knots which, when multiplied by 1.3, produces a Vref of 46 knots. But, as any Cessna 182 pilot will attest, you can’t reasonably expect to fly final approach in this airplane at 46 knots. The POH suggests a final approach airspeed range of 60-70 knots with full flaps, which is closer to 1.9 Vso.

 

The Art of Interpolation

The numbers published in the POH were generated by an FAA-approved team of engineers and test pilots through a rigorous aircraft certification process. These numbers exist to give the pilot a framework within which to create a stabilized approach and landing, but we need to read the fine print in order to use these numbers effectively.

Stall speeds and final approach speeds are generally published for the airplane at or near maximum gross weight. Yet, we rarely land an airplane when it’s that heavy, because presumably we have been flying around for a while, burning avgas at the rate of six pounds per gallon per hour. We know that an airplane’s stall speed increases with an increase in weight (or with an increase in load factor, such as during a turn; see “Getting It Right in Maneuvering Flight” on page 15), so this means that the actual Vso at the moment of landing is likely to be something lower than what’s listed in the POH. Turning the problem upside down, we can say that most of the time we have a greater margin between the airplane’s actual stalling speed and our final approach airspeed than what the POHwould suggest.

The benefit of this wisdom is that if we follow the numbers and maintain the POH-suggested airspeeds for each phase of flight, we are in a position to make a stabilized approach and landing. The danger is that if we routinely tack on 5 or 10

knots under the false assumption that faster is always safer, we may be setting ourselves up for a go-around at best, or a very hard landing at worst.

 

The Gust Factor

One of the few times we want to fly faster than published on final is if it’s a really windy, gusty day. The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A) recommends adding one-half of the reported surface-wind gust to the normal final-approach airspeed when landing in turbulent conditions to compensate for any sudden loss of headwind component. But, why not add the whole gust amount, or double it? Why add anything, if the published final approach airspeed already has a built-in cushion above the stall?

The simple answer is that gusts are variable and unpredictable, and we want to ensure that we can outsmart them by carrying enough speed to get us to the pavement safely despite them. The airspeed indicator can fluctuate wildly and be difficult to read on days when we’re getting batted around like a beach ball, so we’d rather overestimate our airspeed than underestimate it and risk a stall. If we discover during the approach that adding half the gust factor to our speed on final was too much and we end up too high and too fast, we can go around and try the approach again at a slightly slower airspeed.

The POH for the Cessna 182S states “normal landing approaches can be made with power on or power off with any flap setting desired. For a short-field landing in smooth conditions, make the power-off approach at 60 KIAS with full flaps. (Slightly higher approach speeds should be used under turbulent conditions.)” For normal landings on longer runways, final approach should be flown at 70-80 knots without flaps, or 60-70 knots with full flaps. Though the POH does not suggest what flap setting to use in turbulent air, it leaves the door open for the pilot to use any flap setting from 0-30 degrees that will get the job done.

Here’s where experience and the art of interpolation comes into play, and why adding half the gust factor is a good compromise on a gusty day. Let’s say we’re approaching a 5,000-foot runway— more than twice what this airplane requires—on a very turbulent day, with surface winds reported as 20 knots gusting to 30 knots with a variable crosswind that is typical when such conditions exist. The gust factor is the difference between the gust and the sustained wind, in this case 10 knots. So, we plan to fly final approach five knots faster than normal. What’s normal? The published range for a normal approach is 60-70 knots, so to what number within that range do we add the five knots? Is using full flaps a good idea on a day like this, in this airplane? Probably not, because the wind can reach under those flaps and grab hold of the wing like a professional wrestler flipping his opponent to the mat.

Recall that the airplane’s actual stall speed is probably lower than advertised due to its lighter weight. Start with the lower number, 60 knots, and add five to that. Try flying final approach at 65 knots with just 20 degrees of flaps and see how

that works. If at any point the gusts are so strong that you hear the stall horn squeak or have any trouble controlling the airplane, given your level of experience, then go around and try the next approach at 70 knots with 10 degrees of flaps, and see if that feels better.

 

It’s a Wing Thing

An airplane’s wing design and resultant stall characteristics also play an important role in determining Vref and final-approach speed, as well as the airplane’s relative tendency to remain in ground effect during the landing.

The Cessna 182S uses a conventional, riveted aluminum wing that is twisted slightly along its length so that the wing tips present a lower angle of attack than the wing root, allowing the ailerons to remain effective well into the stall. This design has been proven for many decades and is still being produced. Now, consider the seamless, composite, laminar-flow wing of a 2007 Cirrus SR22 G3. The G3 wing is also twisted to maximize aileron effectiveness during the stall, but employs additional features such as stall strips and a two-section leading edge.

The SR22 is flown at Vref minus one knot for short-field landings (77 knots) and a few knots faster for normal approaches (80 knots), and always using full flaps, if available. The SR22 POH lists Vso at maximum gross weight as 59 knots at the most forward CG position and 61 knots at the most aft CG position. If we take the median, 60 knots, and multiply by 1.3 we get a Vref of 78 knots.

Why is there such a difference between Vref and Vso for these airplanes? Though these airplanes are of similar size, weight, and performance, the wing design is the primary reason for the difference in their stall behavior and recommended landing speeds. One wing is not better than the other; they are just different. The Cessna 182S wing creates more drag than the SR22 wing, and this allows for a steeper and shorter approach and less of a tendency to float in ground effect. The SR22 G3 wing (as well as its more powerful engine) allows it to cruise about 30 knots faster than the Cessna 182S, but the G3 wing (and the overall body design of the SR22) results in a faster final-approach speed and longer required landing distances than the Cessna 182S.

 

Final Thoughts on Final Approach

Pilots who “fly by the numbers” with precision and accuracy are able to fly stabilized approaches, and make consistently smooth landings, because the numbers they follow provide a proven framework for success. These pilots are not reinventing the propeller, so to speak, on each approach. This methodology is what makes airline travel so safe, and it can work for general aviation pilots, too.

 

Meredith Saini is a flight instructor and active general aviation pilot. She works as a contractor supporting the Flight Standards Service, General Aviation and Commercial Division at FAA Headquarters in Washington, DC.

 

    How many experienced pilots say “I’m sorry, can you repeat that—I don’t hear very well?” Then they get the sophomoric response from the young pilots “Say what?”

    Hearing loss in pilots is almost universal and especially in pilots who learned to fly without headsets.

    When I first started instruction, the instructor had to shout over the engine noise and I still blame all my current bad habits on those miscommunications!

    Hearing loss, in the far majority of people, is due primarily to exposure to loud noise and to some extent, heredity. Loud concerts, noise from drilling, hammering, riveting, wind noises, engine noises, and supersonic prop tips all contribute to hearing loss.

    What is important for everyone to understand is that noise exposure is cumulative. So even when someone already has hearing loss, they need to be aggressive about protecting what they have left because they will continue to lose more hearing with additional exposure.

    Sound intensity is measured in decibels and the scale is logarithmic so a deference of 3 dB is approximately twice the level of sound. In additions, there is “frequency weighting” because some frequencies, particular the 2,000 to 6,000 Hertz range, cause more hearing loss than other frequencies. (For you audio techies out there, I know this is not as simple as this explanation states but this is not a treatise on sound measurements.) General conversation occurs between 500-3000 Hertz.

    To understand the decibel ratings (know as dB level), OHSA (Occupation Health & Safety Administration) standards state the 85 dB over eight hours is safe but only two hours at 91 dB. However, the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) has identified the level of 70 dB for 24 hour exposure to protect the public from hearing loss which is significantly lower than OHSA.

    Putting this in perspective, a jet taking off has a 180 dB rating. Riveting creates a 120 db level while a car horn at about 20 feet is a 100db. Pain usually begins at about 125 dB but hearing loss can occur with as little as one minute exposure to 100 dB which is about the sound level of a cement mixer.

    It really is impossible to give a dB level of noise in an aircraft unless measured (a reasonable portable dB meter is available from Radio Shack). Piston aircraft create noise from the engine through the exhaust and vibration, propeller blades beating the air, and airflow around the fuselage. Each aircraft has so many variables with these factors that no average level really is valid but the FAA states the range is between 70 and 90 dB. (Obviously, the FAA has never measured a Stearman!) What is valid is that all most all aircraft in the piston fleet will cause hearing loss over time.

    There are no regulatory criteria for aircraft occupants in general aviation which is good by keeping government out of our lives. Unfortunately, the other side of that coin is there are neither standards nor testing for ear protection in aircraft so buyers beware.

    Everyone should wear hearing protection and the type breaks down into passive and active protection. Passive ear protection includes the classic foam plugs and standard but relatively inexpensive headsets. The foam or wax plugs work very well but must be placed in the ear properly. For the foam plugs, this means that the plug must be rolled small enough to fit into the ear so that it completely seals the canal when it expands. The molded wax or custom plastic plugs work very well and are easier to place properly albeit more expensive.

    Passive headsets do not require any fitting and my recommendation is to buy the highest dB reduction set available. It is important to buy a reputable brand since there are no government standards or testing required when bought in the civilian world.

    Active noise reduction headsets (ANR) are more problematic. Most of the audible noise in an aircraft is lower frequency which is handled very well by the electronic portion of the ANR headset. However, higher frequency, less audible noise, which causes hearing damage, is generally not reduced very well by the ANR headset’s passive attenuation. This leads to a false sense of security with ANR headsets.

    My recommendation is to use foam/wax/molded ear plugs under ANR headsets in the aircraft. This will give you the best of both worlds. When working in the hangar, use the highest passive attenuation passive ear muffs available. I recommend ear muffs in the hangar because they are easy to put on and take off which increases use even for short exposures.

            The most important point is the use of some type of ear protection anytime there is exposure to loud noise. It will help avoid those dumb jokes in the future.  < B.B.

    If you own, or are thinking of owning, an aircraft manufactured in another country and imported into the United States, you should be aware of the ruling of the NTSB in a recent case. Here are the facts as a prospective purchaser would see them:

    The Aerospatiale Alouette II helicopter has been manufactured in France since the 1950’s and has been used as a military aircraft. At least 70 Alouette II helicopters have been imported into the United States and have been given Normal Category Standard Airworthiness Certificates by the FAA. The particular helicopter involved in this case was manufactured in September of 1959 and went directly to the German military. The Buyers purchased a helicopter with a US Normal Category Standard Airworthiness Certificate, and with an existing N registration, as one of three Alouette II helicopters they were considering for purchase, all of which had US registration numbers and Normal Category Standard Airworthiness Certificates. The FAA had previously issued a Type Certificate – No. 7H1 – for this model helicopter. An FAA Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR) had issued the Standard Airworthiness Certificate for the helicopter. The helicopter in question had been the subject of an “attestation” written on the letterhead of “Aviation Civile” which stated “Although we have not inspected ourselves [helicopter SE 3130 – Alouetter II S/N 1312], we can certify . . . on the basis of the information listed on the individual record inspection log book at Erocopter’s, that . . . the basis design of the above mentioned helicopter . . . was at the time of manufacture . . . compliant with DGAC Type Certificate No. 1 and with the FAA Type Certificate No. 7H1”. The FAA expressly agreed that the helicopter was safe for operation.

    The Buyers bought the helicopter for $165,000.00 and put it to work in a commercial operation.

    The FAA had, since 2004, had concerns with military surplus helicopters. The FAA, unbeknownst to the public, had formed the “Charter Quest Special Emphasis Investigations Team” based out of the Alliance Airport in the Southwest Region, for the specific purpose of looking through the documentation of each of the foreign military surplus helicopters operating on Normal Category Standard Airworthiness Certificates to make sure that they each had proper documentation that the French Government had issued an appropriate letter after an inspection of each particular helicopter. If they did not find such a document, the FAA would then issue an Order of Emergency Revocation of the Airworthiness Certificate of the helicopter. That is what happened here. (In prior columns, I have written about my perception that the FAA is abusing their power to determine that an emergency situation exists. This is just one more example of that. In this case, everyone agreed that the aircraft was perfectly safe to operate, and that the only alleged problem was a problem of documentation. In fact, at the time of the hearing, the FAA had issued an “Experimental Airworthiness Certificate” to the same aircraft. So, what was the “emergency”?)

    Now, dear reader, you might be asking yourself, “well, didn’t these buyers have a letter from the French Government?” And the answer would be, “sort of”.

    It turns out that the actual arm of the French Government which has the power to issue Type Certificate Data Sheets is called the “Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC).” Our buyers had an attestation from the “Groupement Pour la Securite Aviation Civile (GSAC)”. This entity shares the same logo as the DGAG.

    The Trial Judge, in his Order, stated: “I think it was brought up and brought to our attention that the fifteenth revision to this type certificate data sheet identifies these people as being the same as the DGAC of France or the civil aviation authority over there.” The NTSB itself, only noted in its opinion: “Groupement Pour la Securite Avaition Civile appears to be a French organization separate from the DGAC, but involved in promoting aviation safety by conducting inspections.”

    (I find it alarming that neither the FAA counsel, nor the attorney for the buyers – or for that matter the NTSB, appear to have even performed a Google search of this group. If they had, they would have known that, according to the GSAC: “The Direction G‚n‚rale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) has delegated to the Groupement pour la S‚curit‚ de l’Aviation Civile (GSAC) the responsibility to carry out aeronautical technical inspection tasks in its name. The GSAC is a public-private economic interest group, grouping together DGAC, Bureau Veritas and SOFREAVIA. It carries out inspections and checkings of aircrafts, aircraft parts and gears, in France and other countries. It audits institutions in the design, production and maintenance fields, including the engineer training institutions. The inspections, checkings and audits serve the purpose of issuing and renewing airworthiness certificates and permit to fly, aircraft operator certificates, design, production and maintenance approvals, ground mechanic training organisation approvals, aircraft station licenses (LSA) and ground mechanic licenses. In other words, the GSAC is, in fact, the entity that has been delegated the authority to inspect for compliance with the requirements of airworthiness certificates on behalf of the DGAC. This is why they share a common logo.”)

    Both the Judge and the NTSB seemed to get this distinction somewhat, although the FAA contended to the end that the GSAC is not the French government, therefore, the buyers’ certificate came from the wrong people.

    What tripped up the buyers ultimately, however, was the first sentence fragment of the attestation that they did provide: “Although we have not inspected this helicopter...” The actual Type Certificate Data Sheet No. 7H1, issued by the FAA for the Aerospatiale Alouette II helicopter, specifically provides, however: “A U.S. Airworthiness Certificate may be issued on the basis of a Certificate of Airworthiness for Export signed by a representative of the Secretariat General a l’Avaition Civile containing the following statement: ‘The helicopter covered by this certificate has been examined and found to comply with U.S. Civil Air Regulation Part 6, dated January 15, 1951, including Amendments 6-1 through 6-8, and with the Special Requirements notified to the Government of France by the Government of the United States of America and conforms to T.C. 7H1.’ “This type of certification by a foreign Government is known as a “Certificate de Navigability.”

    There was nothing that the buyers could produce to show that any arm of the French government, whether that be the DGAC itself, or the GSAC acting as the delegated representative of the DGAC, had actually inspected the aircraft at the time of export to assure the United States Government that no modifications had been made which might have caused the aircraft not to have complied with the French Type Certificate No. 1 or the US Type Certificate No. 7H1.

    “But”, you might ask, “didn’t a US Designated Airworthiness Representative inspect the helicopter to determine that it was airworthy and safe for operation before granting the helicopter a Normal Category Standard Airworthiness Certificate?” Yes, one sure did. In fact, the way it worked is that an A&P went over this helicopter and its logbooks with a fine-tooth comb and decided that it was airworthy. The A&P then certified this finding to the DAR, who made his own inspection, agreed, and issued the Standard Airworthiness Certificate. The statement of a DAR is considered the act of the FAA Administrator himself, since the DAR is the Administrator’s designated representative.

    However, and this cannot be stressed enough, the concept of “airworthiness” – as interpreted by the FAA and the NTSB is not simply a certification that the aircraft is safe for operation. The test for “airworthiness” is a two-pronged test, the first prong of which is that “the aircraft is in compliance with its Type Certificate Data Sheet.”

    What really happened here, and it is not the first time this has happened, nor is it likely to be the last, is that the FAA changed its mind. Even though there were some 70 buyers out there who had acted in good faith, and had relied on the A&P’s who inspected the logbooks and the helicopters, the DAR’s who inspected the logbooks and the helicopters, the FAA Certification Branch which issued the Type Certificate for the helicopter back in 1951 (when it was the CAA), and who registered the aircraft in N registry, the FAA decided that it no longer liked the fact that people were using these older foreign military surplus helicopters for commercial operations. So they set up a special unit to go out and find ways to declare these helicopters “un-airworthy” and to revoke their certificates on an emergency basis.

    The Administrative Law Judge was extremely apologetic to the buyers throughout his opinion. In speaking about cases like this where the Administrator changes his mind, he stated: “Once the Administrator takes that action, it’s extremely unfair to the folks that it’s directed to, but at the same time, you can’t help but step back and say, well, what other choice did the Administrator have under the circumstances?” When the FAA tried to blame the buyers, saying that the buyers had not done their due diligence, the Judge shot back: “He (the buyer) went out there with three of these helicopters. They looked at the airworthiness certificate. They looked beyond the airworthiness certificate. They looked at the logbooks and records, and they believed that because it did have an airworthiness certificate and these other records from the Administrator that it was a good buy, and they paid $165,000 for that aircraft. And now, with this emergency order of suspension, even though it has an experimental certificate, it cannot be used for any of the purposes they talked about and that they had used it for before, because you can’t use an experimental aircraft for commercial purposes..”

    Also in responding to the Administrator’s argument that the buyers didn’t perform their due diligence, the Judge said: “one of [these arguments] was that these people didn’t do their due diligence, but they did. If there’s anybody that didn’t do their due diligence, it was the representatives of the Administrator in not following up on this.”

    Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge felt that he had no choice and suspended the Standard Airworthiness Certificate for the helicopter. The buyers appealed to the NTSB. The Board was also somewhat sympathetic to the buyers, saying: “We note that DAR Cernuda’s and Mr. Marrs’s mistakes are troubling, and we sympathize with respondents’ position that they relied upon the FAA to issue a standard certificate of airworthiness for N225RW only if the aircraft was airworthy. However, we have previously held that such errors do not prohibit the FAA from taking action against a certificate.”

    There are important lessons to be learned from this case. While most modern aircraft being manufactured in foreign countries apply for, and receive, US Type Certificates at the time of their manufacture, and are approved for direct sale by dealers in this country – as opposed to having to be imported from their country of manufacture – many older aircraft lack this documentation. The rules for each of these aircraft are different, and must be understood at a great level of detail by the people who wish to buy and operate them in the United States. Buyers of older foreign aircraft should be aware of this.

            In addition, it is important for aviators to understand that each Flight Standards District Office and Regional Center has the ability to assemble Special Emphasis Investigation Teams. This is being done more and more in recent years. These teams generally operate more-or-less in secret, with little or no public notice, with the goal of correcting a perceived problem that is not isolated. Such a team led to the shutdown of TAG, allegedly for issues concerning control by a foreign company; and other similar matters. They are often heavy-handed, developing new ways of looking at regulations to support their conclusions, gathering evidence under the cover of inspections of other, seemingly-insignificant matters, and then pouncing all at once, bringing the work of the subject of the investigation to an immediate standstill with no warning, and using expedited procedures to force the subject to gather his evidence and present his defense in less than thirty days all the while trying to pay attorneys without any present cash flow. Is it unfair? You bet it is. In a true “emergency” as most of us understand it – when there is imminent danger of death, personal injury, or property damage – it makes sense for the FAA to use these powers. But using them to enforce a policy change with regard to paperwork violations having nothing to do with safety, is simply wrong at every level.

If you own or maintain an aircraft which flies behind a TCM fuel injected engine, you'll want to read this. 
I want to find out how many of you realize what TCM is doing right now.  TCM is presently trying to restrict fair trade within the aviation community.  I own a company called Aircraft Fuel Specialists, Ltd. and have operated my business since 1977.  I am one of the few companies that specialize in the repair and overhaul of reciprocating aircraft fuel systems such as carburetors, fuel injection systems, and fuel pumps.  Over many years, Teledyne Continental Motors has made an active effort to put businesses like mine out of the business of TCM fuel system repairs by various methods.  First, they tried to "price" us out of the market, but those few of us in the industry that had the knowledge, experience, and equipment to overhaul TCM fuel injection systems have managed to hang in there.  Now, since they evidently think they've eliminated enough of us out of the market, TCM has began to raise their prices on exchange fuel systems to nose bleed levels once again and it's getting even higher.  As if that isn't bad enough, now they are attempting a new tactic to get rid of the few shops around the world that still overhaul their systems.  They are refusing to distribute the parts to enable us to do proper repairs, so when the existing parts in the system are depleted, mechanics and owners will have no choice but to go to TCM for an exchange for any problem they might have with their fuel systems.  They are also telling anyone who will listen that they are the only ones authorized to overhaul their fuel systems even though they issued overhaul manuals for many years and one can still purchase an overhaul manual and obtain FAA certification to overhaul their systems.  I'm quite sure that the price of an exchange fuel system will go up to a level that few aircraft owners who fly behind a TCM engine could imagine once the few remaining shops are gone if something isn't done.  Right now, if I call their "customer support" to get help with information on a fuel system, they tell me they won't provide any information and that I shouldn't be overhauling their systems.  They state, "The overhaul manual your using is one we have deleted and we no longer support".  Of course, I have four copies of their manual and mine are not deleted, but that doesn't seem to matter to them.  TCM tells me emphatically that they are not selling the parts for TCM fuel injection systems any more and that once the parts in the system are used up, there will not be any more from them. 

Even the FAA seems to be engaged in an effort to make those of us who make a living overhauling TCM fuel systems stop and it seems like TCM has in some way influenced them to do so.  TCM has a responsibility to provide "continued airworthiness" for their systems and they have failed miserably in this for as long as I can remember and the FAA seems to be oblivious to this fact.  TCM has refused to provide information and updates on their fuel systems in order to allow us who overhaul and repair them to do so with safety and reliability.  We have been forced to seek out information by what ever means we can to provide safe and reasonably priced units for the aviation community.  Of course, what they want is the ability to have anyone who needs a simple repair to be required to exchange a component or the entire system.  You see, TCM doesn't do repairs, and they won't overhaul your system, but they would be happy to exchange your entire fuel pump for need of one $5.00 oring.

This is all going to get nasty, very nasty. 

The Federal Aviation Administration’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City offers a dynamic  course to help pilots understand physiological and psychological stresses of flight. The one day course is a must for anyone who flies higher than 10,000 feet but is valuable for all pilots.

    The course covers the common physiologic problems of flight as well as some of the uncommon ones like decompression sickness. Probably the most important part of the course is the experience in the altitude (hypobaric) chamber which cannot be easily duplicated in an aircraft.

    Pilots understand that training and recurrent training is important. Understanding physiologic issues is difficult without experiencing them and then periodically, revisiting the subject for new developments and reminders about how serious these problems may be.

    Spatial disorientation is one area that many pilots last felt on a spinning ride at a playground many years in the past. Adults tend to think that it takes that kind of force and velocity to create spatial disorientation because they have not felt the sensation in an aircraft.

    The FAA demonstrates that the initiators of do not require major forces using equipment like a Barany chair, a Vertigon, a GYRO, or a Virtual Reality Spatial Disorientation Demonstrator. This is the type of training that might have saved the life of John Kennedy Jr. and many other pilots­both high and low time.

    The use and abuse of oxygen and oxygen equipment is covered in the course as well as how to use a pulse oximeter. Understanding why the FAA recommends oxygen as low as 5,000 feet at night is covered as well as high altitude hypoxia in the chamber.

    The chamber experience is certainly dramatic. Pilots are taken to as high as 25,000 feet in the chamber and asked to remove their oxygen. They are then asked to do some simple math problems or other simple tasks. Watching the video of pilots going really stupid is entertaining and educational. The video is used to show this behavior because the hypoxic victim cannot recall how dumb they were.

    Rapid decompression from 8,000 to 18,000 feet is another demonstration that cannot be duplicated in an aircraft. Just knowing what that feels like and knowing what to expect is a real eye opener.

    Every pilot should go through a personal physiologic and psychological check list prior to each flight. The FAA uses the acronym “I M SAFE”. The acronym stands for Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, and Emotion. Let’s go through this simple check list.

    Illness may seem straight forward but there are many pilots who took off with their stuffy noise from the spring hay fever season who suffered incapacitation pain when they could not clear their ears on decent. The stuffy nose did not appear to be important on the ground but aviation presents many unique factors to illness.

    Medications can definitely be a problem. No pilot should fly when starting new medications since every drug can cause side effects regardless of the labeling. Of particular concern are psychoactive medications. A psychoactive medication ranges from psychological drugs like anti anxiety agents to simple antihistamines over the counter. Any drug that can affect the brain, whether it is sedating or alerting, can pose problems in the cockpit. Altitude may also increase side effects of medications.

    Stress can have significant impact flight safety. Regional airline pilots has claimed, rightly so, that they jobs are harder than the big iron pilots due to all the takeoffs and landings in a day at uncontrolled airports with marginal weather reporting equipment. This is the kind of stress that leads to mistakes­most not so serious but some are tragically fatal. This same kind of stress can affect general aviation pilots. Getting up early for business trips with returns late on the same day is a classic example of stress for a GA pilot.

    Alcohol is generally an obvious problem for piloting an aircraft. What also has to be considered is the effect of residual alcohol from the night before and/or a hangover on pilot performance. Also, a hangover will increase the risk of motion sickness, spatial disorientation, and cognitive mistakes.

    Fatigue goes hand in hand with stress. It can be a real problem on long flights as well as cause real impairment as the work load increases.

    Emotion is a factor that frequently gets overlooked. Going out and doing touch and goes may not be the best way to shake off the anger generated by your teenage kids. The effect of emotions on the thought process and the ability to perform complex task is significant.

            More information on the CAMI course can be found at http://www.faa.gov/pilots/training/airman_education/aerospace_physiology/index.cfm. Courses are also given as several military facilities around the country.

 The Washington DC Court of Appeals recently gave  a little relief to hundreds of pilots who have been  accused by the FAA of “intentional” falsification of federal records and whose certificates had been revoked on an emergency basis. Essentially, the FAA took the position, and the NTSB had been upholding it, that the FAA did not have to prove that the airman intended to falsify the entry. The FAA felt that the mere fact that an important entry was incorrect would automatically “prove” that the airman intended to deceive the FAA.

    Most commonly, this issue came up in regard to the airman’s answers to Question 18v on the Application to Renew Medical Certificate. The FAA basically felt that it was totally incredible to believe that someone who had been stopped by the police for a supposed alcohol-related charge, and who answered “no” to the question, didn’t intend to deceive the FAA. In the collective mind of the FAA, pilots should know that they need to err on the side of full disclosure of all alcohol-related stops.

    Question 18w also came in for review. The question asks about convictions for crimes other than non-alcohol-related traffic crimes. One pilot, who had a criminal conviction for forgery, testified that he had discussed this question with his AME. Both he and his AME told the Administrative Law Judge that the AME had advised the pilot that the only thing the FAA was interested in on this form was a conviction for alcohol or drug-related matters. The NTSB felt that this information was irrelevant because the pilot also testified that he now understands that this information was incorrect and that he should have answered the question “yes”. The DC Circuit Court ruled that the NTSB had to consider the pilot’s arguments and testimony, and could not simply ignore it.

    As many of you are aware, the FAA has been using its “emergency” powers more and more recently lately. In fact, as of last year, fully 46% of all of the appeals heard by the NTSB from decisions made by Administrative Law Judges were from emergency appeals. This means that more than half of all FAA enforcement actions are now classified as “emergency” actions, forcing the airman to send back his or her certificates, stop flying immediately, hire counsel and prepare to go to trial within 30 days. To make matters worse, the FAA had convinced the NTSB that it did not have to prove “intent” to falsify an entry when trying to prove that an airman was guilty of the offense of “intentional falsification”, resulting in the airman being deprive of a hearing if the FAA could simply prove that the information on the forms submitted by the airman was false. This combination of having to defend under the expedited procedures of the emergency determination by the Administrator, and not even being able to show any circumstances under which an improper or incorrect statement might not have been intended by the airman to deceive the FAA, has resulted in a huge number of airmen losing their flying privileges for things that, in years gone by, would never have resulted in such a severe penalty.

    While these two new cases are important, they still give a lot of latitude to the NTSB and the Administrative Law Judges to rehear the cases involved and still to make rulings in favor of the FAA and against the airman. The primary benefit of these cases, however, is that this is one more reminder, from a very high judicial authority, that the FAA really has an obligation to prove that the airman did something wrong and that the appropriate punishment for what the airman did wrong is revocation of the airman’s certificates.

    We can only hope that, at some time in the near future, both the Courts and the Congress will take a look at the way in which the FAA has used its determination that an “emergency” exists. Only the most radical of pilots or lawyers would argue that the FAA should not have the power to enact regulations and to make sure that airmen follow those regulations. In most cases, however, where the FAA believes that a violation exists, I think most informed people would agree that the airman is entitled to an opportunity to present his or her side of the story, and to have his or her arguments listened to by a neutral party. Sane people would also not differ on the fact that the government needs to have the power to stop an activity that imminently threatens the lives of the traveling public, or of people on the ground, without having to wade through a whole bunch of red tape to stop the dangerous activity.

    But many of us in the field have noticed that many, if not most, of the actions the FAA is bringing under its emergency power do not appear to have any imminent threat to the safety of flight. They are, for want of a better adjective, “garden variety” technical regulatory paperwork violations. In some cases, the FAA has researched and investigated the operations for years, and there have been no accidents, or even history of safety violations, when the FAA suddenly files an Emergency Order of Revocation, essentially grounding the operator immediately. In the cases of small operators, this immediate cessation of business usually spells the end of the business in its entirety. The operator simply lacks the cash reserves to keep paying rent, salaries, and other expenses for several months, while at the same time hemorrhaging cash to pay for attorneys and expert witnesses. In effect, even if the operator or the airman prevails in the end, the business has been ruined.

            There is an urgent need to scale back the types of actions for which the FAA can bring an emergency revocation to limit the cases in which they use this drastic power to situations where air safety is truly at issue. These DC Court of Appeals cases, merely hint at a part of the solution. Much more action is needed to solve the underlying problem.

It’s not only major companies like Air Canada and Air France (who both reported losses last quarter), that are suffering, pretty much every company in the aviation industry is feeling the pinch. Airlines are having to up the costs of many amenities like: checked bags, in-flight drinks and blankets to try and make up for the lack of people taking to the air.

Smaller operations are also experiencing difficulties because of a lack of funding for the necessary personnel to perform the jobs that are crucial to flight preparation. Without the proper equipment to align the planes on the runway for take off or to store planes in the hanger upon arrival, the job becomes both exceedingly difficult and quite a bit more expensive to perform.

Outdated machines are cumbersome much more difficult to operate and use up gallon after gallon of costly fuel during operation. Running aircraft tugs that aren’t easy to operate or economical has a very large effect on a company’s budget and can quickly turn a profitable part of your business into a financial liability.

Aircraft tugs from Lindbergh are energy efficient, easy to use and run quietly enough for the operator to remain mindful of his or her surroundings while using them. Lindbergh tugs are also ergonomically correct, making them some of the safest tugs for your employees to use.

One of the best ways to bring down costs in the aviation industry is to useequipment that is efficient, reliable and safe for anyone on your staff to use. You’ll know longer waste man hours by having several members of your staff occupied by the work that could be handled by one with the proper tool for the job. Lindbergh tugs can handle aircraft up to 35,000 lbs quickly and easily at a cost of much less to operate than older gas powered tugs.

How far are you willing to go against your fellow citizens in the name of national security?

 By now, many of us who fly out of air carrier airports have have gone through the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's) latest training program in an effort to prevent terrorists from using GA aircraft to wreak havoc.  In the wake of IRS foe Joseph Stack's kamakazi act on a Texas IRS office recently,  Texas Congressman Mike McCaul was quick to label the crash--which left two people on the ground, one dead and one critically injured; Stack died in the crash--a terrorist act.

One wonders why previous attacks against government installations haven't also been labeled terrorism, but you can bet your bottom gallon of avgas that when politicians use such language, they're going somewhere; there's an agenda. McCaul's party, the GOP, is normally known as foes of big government and freedom-quencing security scrutiny of private citizens, but this time, McCaul is breaking ranks with fellow Republicans most likely to demand a crackdown on General Aviation security.  Even in his zeal, McCaul recognizes no security measures could have prevented Joseph Stack from flying straight into the IRS without an appointment, short of climbing into his head and observing his thought processes. Stack owned the aircraft, presumably had restricted airport access to it, and had no history that would have led us to believe he was headed out on a mission of vengeance.

Which brings up my mixed feelings on the TSA's de-facto deputization of us as pilots, mechanics, and others with legitimate reasons to have access to an aiport. During our security access training, shaped and mandated by the TSA, we're supposed to challenge people we meet to produce an access card, or we report them or detain them. If that doesn't creep you out the way it does to me, you probably don't see the parallels in history. My father fought Nazis in WWII, sunk a U-boat and shot at retreating Germans on Normandy Beach, so this is close to home. In the presence of a culture that had become so terrifyingly vicious... all in the name of safety, order and economic prosperity...that they built the world's largest network of secret police.  National Socialists commandeered Germany's pre war representative democracy, and "encouraged" citizens to report people they deemed disloyal.

So here's my dilemma: If one of us who have been trained and unofficially deputized by the TSA to challenge and confront possible security risks had been present when Joseph Stack approached his airplane, we might have seen enough telltale emotional or personality symptoms to have prevented his attack. But, would you have done it?

While recently renewing my CFII certificate, I had to answer such a question. I got it wrong because I picked the obviously wrong answer, and wrote a note to Gleim, the flight instructor renewal course provider. What I told them is that I am not comfortable with being asked to exercise semi-police powers when I have not had law enforcement training to recognize problems and protect myself, all without a weapon.  I have a wife and children, for gosh sakes. The people at Gleim were more than sympathetic, and agreed that I should be able to opt out of the TSA's demi-cop program, for safety's sake.  But getting back to Stack; I might have prevented his flight, but I might have been hurt or killed by trying to prevent it, and that's the dilemma.

Sadly there's another dilemma, too; the morality of tattling on fellow aviators, reporting them to the TSA, police or FAA.  What is your political belief, religion or philosophy? What is your ethnic background or gender? If the day comes when you happen to be one of those society deems a threat or a danger, today's security rules could become tomorrow's portal to persecution. The reason we agreed to open the door was safety, an altar at which most Americans bow today--just look at the cottage industry of liability lawyers and the companies that make safety equipment mandated on new cars--but when the law is abused and the government is too powerful, the reason for starting it all is lost in the fog.

Every time the TSA or Congress want to saddle us with a new security rule, I suggest we scrutinize them carefully, rejecting the ones that restrict our civil rights, fail to make flying safer, and especially those that turn our neighbors into quasi cops and informants. Yes, that means letters, phone calls to media and government, but aren't those part of our normal responsibilities as American citizens and voters, anyway?

There are plenty of issues we face everyday in the airline industry, this weekend gave of a perfect example of constraints put on our jobs that are completely out of our control. The East Coast (particularly the Mid-Atlantic region) was pounded with an outrageous storm that dropped anywhere from six up to more than twenty four inches of snow in certain locations. Areas around Washington DC, Philadelphia and the entire State of Delaware where punished particularly hard, making conditions completely impossible to fly in – thousands and thousands of flights in the Mid-Atlantic region were cancelled, leaving travelers stranded and unable to get to their intended destinations.

Mother Nature is responsible for many of the things that make this line of work particularly difficult; snow, rain, ice and clouds can make both the actual flying and all of the prep work to get the planes up into the air dangerous or impossible tasks. This is, unfortunately something that is out of our control, but it doesn’t mean that every facet of our jobs has to be difficult.

Using the proper equipment to get your planes in position on the runway or properly placed in tight hangers once the flight is done makes that part of the job much easier. Using ergonomically correct and reliable airplane tugs reduces both the stress on the body and the mind and makes your crew much happier and more efficient. Once runways have been cleaned and the skies have been cleared for flight you want to ensure that the rest of the process, that part that you and your crew control goes as smoothly and easily as possible and the best possible way to do so is to use the best equipment for the job. We at Lindbergh offer the most versatile, reliable and easy to use equipment for moving aircraft of up to 35,000 lbs. You may not be able to control Mother Nature, but if you’ve got a tug from Lindbergh you’ll have no trouble controlling your plane when it’s time to fly.

As a bush pilot servicing hunters, fishermen and explorers in wildernesses, ranging from Alaska to the Amazon you have a pretty tough job. Not only do you have to deal with flying in adverse weather conditions, you need to land on really rough terrains, from icy plateaus to swampy lagoons and everything else in between. Also, you need to be an expert mechanics as you often will need to repair your aircraft far from a service center.

Additionally, you need to learn first-aid and wilderness survival for emergency situations.  Of course, living the life of a pilot is not without its reward. Being close to nature and taking in some of the most beautiful views is something most folks only dream about.  But it’s totally understandable that you want to find ways to make things easier and better. Why work hard when you can “work smart”!

When you are back home and your aircraft needs servicing or transporting, theLindbergh Aircraft Company provides great solutions for moving your plane in and out of the hangar. Even if your FBO is unpaved, LINDY’S AIRCRAFTCADDY 4K will make moving your plane on gravel, ice or snow as easy as gliding thru clear blue skies.  This battery-powered tug can pull or push aircrafts weighing up to 4,000 lbs and works quietly without all the noise of a typical combustion-engine airplane mover.

You can connect Lindy’s airplane tug to your aircraft effortlessly as you slide the easy-on roller cradle under the nose wheel. You can then easily maneuver your plane with the ability to make 180 degree turns without adjusting the aircraft wheels or steering mechanism. Acceleration and braking is all perfectly controlled, allowing for smooth handling. Unloading the aircraft after you move it is just as easy as you release the locking lever on the handle of the tug.

Take off today knowing that with Lindy’s Aircraft Caddy your job just got easier!